Judicial Guardians: Court Curbing Bills and Supreme Court Judicial Review

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Abstract

Previous studies examining the relationship between the introduction of court curbing bills and the instances of judicial review on the Supreme Court have two potential oversights. First, they rely solely on instances of judicial review and not the potential for such action. There are two reasons judicial review might decrease following the introduction of court-curbing bills: the Court considers fewer constitutional cases or the Court upholds more acts of Congress after introductions of court-curbing bills. We consider two dependent variables: the percentage of cases in each term where an act of Congress’s constitutionality is in question; and the percentage of those cases where the Court strikes down the act of Congress. Second, these studies have assumed that the Court acts as a guardian of the judiciary, but have not tested this. Since the bulk of court-curbing bills are directed at lower courts, if the Court fills this “guardian” role, then we should see them correcting instances of judicial review on the lower courts. To test this, we look at the cases where the lower court decision was decided on constitutional grounds and examine the frequency with which the Court “corrects” instances of judicial review on lower courts.
United States Supreme Court decisions regarding controversial federal statutes or other hot-button political issues are often criticized by those who oppose the ruling, such as the media, political pundits, members of Congress, or the public. For example, Senator Ted Cruz (R-TX) said he would introduce a constitutional amendment to establish retention elections for Supreme Court Justices after the tax credit provisions of the Affordable Care Act were upheld in *King v. Burwell* (2015) and same-sex marriage was legalized in *Obergefell v. Hodges* (2015) (e.g., Zezima 2015). Cruz’s attempt to institute electoral accountability in the Supreme Court is a standard example of court-curbing legislation. Other proposals to alter the composition of the bench usually entail instituting a mandatory retirement age for justices and/or federal judges. Court-curbing legislation can have other objectives such as stripping the judiciary of jurisdiction over certain statutes or policy areas (e.g., cases involving gay marriage or school prayer), or placing restrictions or limitations on the exercise of judicial review (e.g., congressional override procedures). Although there are differences among the purpose of court-curbing bills, each initiative is similar in that it attempts to influence judicial decision making and restrict judicial power and authority.

The interaction between the U.S. Congress and the Supreme Court that results from the introduction of court-curbing legislation is included in the separation of powers literature that examines how the branches of the federal government create and implement public policy. Most studies focus on how Congress constrains judicial decision-making (e.g., Bergara, Richman, and Spiller 2003; Epstein, Knight, and Martin 2001; Hansford and Damore 2000; Sala and Spriggs 2004; Segal 1997; Segal, Westerland, and Lindquist 2011) and/or the conditions under which Congress can override Supreme Court decisions (e.g., Blackstone 2013; Eskridge 1991; Ignagni and Meernik 1994; Uribe, Spriggs, and Hansford 2014). As a result, the ability of Congress to
influence judicial decision making with court-curbing legislation is an important but underexplored issue in the Court-Congress relations literature. Thus, a crucial research question is: how does the introduction of court-curbing bills constrain judicial independence?

Sponsoring court-curbing legislation is largely considered a position-taking endeavor that members of Congress use to express personal and constituent disagreement with Supreme Court decisions (Clark 2009, 2011). Since members of Congress introduce court-curbing bills to help them in their pursuit of reelection, the bills are rarely passed into law (e.g., Bell and Scott 2006; Clark 2011; Nagel 1965). Regardless, court-curbing bills are deemed successful mechanisms for attempting to influence judicial decisionmaking because the legislation attacks the judiciary’s legitimacy, which the Court strives to protect at all costs (e.g., Clark 2009, 2011; Rosenberg 1992). Thus, multiple studies have found that court-curbing legislation results in the Court deferring to congressional preferences and striking down fewer federal statutes (e.g., Clark 2009, 2011; Epstein, Knight, and Martin 2001; Handberg and Hill 1980; Marshall, Curry, and Pacelle 2014; Nagel 1965; Rosenberg 1992).

Previous work examining how court-curbing legislation constrains judicial decision making has two potential oversights. First, studies rely on instances of judicial review rather than the potential for such action. In other words, the research cannot capture whether court-curbing legislation leads the Court to utilize the “constitutional avoidance” doctrine in which the justices choose to interpret statutes in a manner that would not render them unconstitutional or produce constitutional concerns (see Justice Louis Brandeis’ concurring opinion in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority [1936]). It is possible that the Court strikes down fewer Acts of Congress because it considers fewer constitutional cases after the introduction of court-curbing bills. Second, the existing literature assumes that the Court acts as a guardian of the federal
courts by adjusting its decision making after court-curbing bills are introduced that attack the judiciary’s institutional legitimacy. However, many of these bills are targeted at lower courts, meaning that the Supreme Court acts as protector not only of its own court, but the entire federal judiciary. This assumption has never been explicitly tested.

In order to address these oversights and gaps in the literature, this study first tests whether the Supreme Court responds to court-curbing legislation by invalidating fewer federal laws by deciding fewer constitutional cases, or instead, upholds more Acts of Congress following the introduction of court-curbing bills. Second, the research examines whether the Court fulfills this “guardian” role of protecting the federal judiciary from attacks on its institutional legitimacy—via court-curbing legislation—by the justices correcting instances of judicial review from the lower courts. Overall, the analyses contribute to the existing literature by providing a better understanding of judicial behavior in relation to congressional attempts to constrain the Supreme Court with court-curbing proposals.

**Constraining Judicial Decision Making with Court-Curbing Legislation**

Court-curbing bills seek to limit judicial power and influence judicial decision making by proposing changes to the federal judiciary’s composition, jurisdiction, or procedures. Some initiatives would only impact the Supreme Court whereas others target the entire federal judiciary. Initial descriptive studies on the effect of court-curbing legislation on judicial behavior sought to determine whether the Supreme Court deferred to congressional preferences—or engaged in sophisticated decision making—after the bills were introduced to avoid the proposed changes to the structure and function of the federal judiciary (Handberg and Hill 1980; Nagel 1965; Rosenberg 1992). Findings indicated that periods of increased court-curbing bill sponsorship coincided with more judicial decisions that reflected congressional preferences as
evidenced by fewer laws deemed unconstitutional, more cases decided in favor of the federal government, and changes in the voting behavior of the justices (Handberg and Hill 1980; Nagel 1965; Rosenberg 1992). Interestingly, this change in judicial behavior persisted although court-curbing bills are rarely considered by committees, let alone enacted into law (Handberg and Hill 1980; Nagel 1965; Rosenberg 1992).

Building on these studies, additional research sought to determine why the Court would respond to court-curbing legislation if it was unlikely that the proposed changes would come to fruition. Most scholars concluded that court-curbing bills are signals of congressional or public disagreement with the judiciary, not serious policy proposals seeking to change the structure and function of federal courts (Handberg and Hill 1980; Nagel 1965; Rosenberg 1992). Furthermore, court-curbing legislation damages the federal judiciary’s institutional legitimacy. The justices will work to regain the judiciary’s reputation by handing down decisions that reflect congressional preferences and (presumably) public opinion (Epstein, Knight, and Martin 2001; Rosenberg 1992).

Clark’s (2009, 2011) conditional self-restraint model formalizes the idea that the Court responds to court-curbing legislation because the bills question the judiciary’s institutional legitimacy, not for seriously threatening the organization or operations of the federal courts. Additionally, these proposals are considered signals of waning public support for the Supreme Court. While building this theory of Court-Congress relations regarding court-curbing legislation, Clark makes assumptions about both legislative and judicial behavior. Members of Congress are said to use court-curbing legislation as a position taking endeavor that responds to constituent disagreement with judicial decision making. In accordance with existing literature, the justices respond to these bills because congressional criticism and waning public support
diminishes the judiciary’s institutional legitimacy, which can also encourage the executive branch and other government officials not to implement decisions.

Empirical results support the conditional self-restraint model in which the justices are most responsive to court-curbing legislation under conditions when the bills are reliable signals of waning institutional legitimacy: sponsored by ideological allies in Congress and introduced when the public disagrees with judicial behavior (Clark 2009, 2011). During periods when there is little public support for the Court, the justices respond to court-curbing legislation by striking down fewer federal statutes in order to regain its good standing with the public and repair its institutional legitimacy as both are essential in ensuring decisions are implemented in a timely manner. The Court elicits similar behavior for the same reasons when court-curbing bills are proposed by its ideological allies in Congress. Since these legislators generally agree with the justices, their court-curbing bills are a credible indication that the judiciary’s institutional legitimacy has diminished (via public and congressional disagreement with judicial behavior), not an effort to criticize the Court and manipulate the ideological content of decisions.

Additional empirical findings reported by Marshall, Curry, and Pacelle (2014) support the conclusion that the justices respond to court-curbing legislation to protect the judiciary’s institutional legitimacy. From 1953-2000, these authors find that the Supreme Court is more likely to change the ideological content of constitutional decisions after the introduction of jurisdiction stripping court-curbing bills than in statutory decisions in which maintaining institutional legitimacy is less of a concern. In contrast to these findings and those of Clark (2009, 2011), Segal, Westerland, and Lindquist (2011) do not find that court-curbing legislation consistently discourages the Court from striking down federal legislation. Regardless of these findings, the existing literature only addresses how court-curbing legislation influences the
ideological content of decisions and whether the Court strikes down an Act of Congress, not if the justices also avoid rendering constitutional decisions after Congress introduces these bills. Furthermore, the research discusses how the justices respond to court-curbing legislation to protect the judiciary’s institutional legitimacy more within the context of the Supreme Court than the entire federal judiciary despite the bills often targeting all federal courts.

**Judicial Review Following the Introduction of Court-Curbing Legislation**

**Describing Court-Congress Relations**

Theories of Court-Congress relations address whether Congress can constrain judicial behavior, and if so, the conditions under which the Court defers to legislative preferences (see Devins 1996; Fisher 1985; Ferejohn and Shipan 1990; Gely and Spiller 1990; Marks 1989; Segal and Spaeth 1993, 2002). Many theories fail to find evidence that Congress can influence judicial decision making in general, or through threats to overturn rulings. Based on the attitudinal model, this is because Congress rarely overrides judicial decisions (Segal and Spaeth 1993, 2002). Similarly, the coordinate construction approach states that the Court expects policy-based responses to its decisions because rulings encourage a constitutional dialogue in Congress (Blackstone 2013; Devins 1996; Fisher 1985; Pickerill 2004).

Clark’s (2009, 2011) conditional self-restraint model pertains specifically to court-curbing legislation, but Congress is only able to constrain judicial behavior through these bills because they signal declining public support for the judiciary and waning institutional legitimacy, not congressional preferences directly. The separation of powers (SOP) model is the primary theoretical framework that views Congress as directly able to influence judicial decision making. According to the SOP model, the Court defers to legislative preferences to avoid reversals that would eliminate any influence the ruling had on policy (e.g., Ferejohn and Shipan...
Empirical research has not found consistent support for the SOP model (e.g., Bergara, Richman, and Spiller 2003; Eskridge 1991; Hansford and Damore 2000; Segal 1997) in constitutional or statutory decision making. Regardless, legislative preferences are expressed via overrides, not court-curbing legislation; and, judicial responses are to avoid reversals, not diminished institutional legitimacy.

The institutional maintenance framework combines the conditional self-restraint model with the SOP model. This model suggests that overrides are not the only way that Congress can influence the Court (Segal, Westerland, and Lindquist 2011). Instead, mechanisms, such as court-curbing bills, threaten judicial authority. The justices will often defer to legislative preferences in order to repair its reputation and restore its institutional legitimacy. The key difference between the SOP model and the institutional maintenance framework is that the Court is less concerned about the policy outcome of a case and Congress retaliating with an override and is more focused on how the judiciary’s institutional legitimacy is vulnerable (Segal, Westerland, and Lindquist 2011). As a result, the institutional maintenance framework is ideal for examining if and how the Court responds to court-curbing legislation in constitutional decisions to protect the judiciary’s institutional legitimacy.

**The Influence of Court-Curbing Bills on Constitutional Decision Making**

The prevailing literature suggests that the Supreme Court responds to court-curbing bills to protect the judiciary’s institutional legitimacy (e.g., Clark 2009, 2011; Marshall, Pacelle, and Curry 2014; Rosenberg 1992). The Court does so by deferring to legislative preferences, whether that is by striking down fewer federal statutes or adjusting the ideological content of decisions (Clark 2009, 2011; Marshall, Curry, and Pacelle 2014). However, existing research has not considered the mechanism through which fewer federal statutes are struck down. One possibility
is that the justices engage in constitutional avoidance by issuing fewer constitutional decisions. Alternatively, the justices may consider the same number of constitutional decisions, in which case striking fewer laws would mean that they uphold more Acts of Congress after the introduction of court-curbing bills. The latter approach is a stronger statement of the conditional self-restraint model. Rather than avoiding the constitutional questions, the Court actually approves more congressional actions. If instead, the Court engages in constitutional avoidance, they can choose to defer the timing in which they bring up a case challenging an Act of Congress, waiting until their interactions with Congress have settled down.

Striking down fewer statutes and considering fewer constitutional cases in response to court-curbing legislation follows the institutional maintenance model of Court-Congress relations. There, court-curbing bills represent congressional disagreement with judicial behavior and threaten the judiciary’s institutional legitimacy. The justices respond by invalidating fewer federal laws in order to regain its reputation because criticism following a constitutional case is especially damaging as the Court, not Congress, is the only branch with the power of constitutional interpretation (e.g., Dickerson v. U.S. [2009]). Decisions are expected to be made using sound legal rationales grounded in the text of the Constitution and criticism expressed via court-curbing legislation signals that the Court’s decisions are activist and based on personal policy preferences.

In statutory decisions, criticism or an override poses very little threat to the Court’s institutional legitimacy because policymaking power is vested primarily in Congress, not the Supreme Court (Cross and Nelson 2001; Segal, Westerland, and Lindquist 2011). Thus, it is plausible that court-curbing legislation actually causes the Court to utilize the “avoidance doctrine” in which the justices approach cases in a manner so as not to address constitutional
concerns or declare federal statutes unconstitutional (see Justice Louis Brandeis’ concurring opinion in *Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority* [1936]). We expect the following:

**H1:** An increase in the number of court-curbing bills introduced decreases the percentage of cases in which the Supreme Court considers the constitutionality of an Act of Congress.

**H2:** An increase in the number of court-curbing bills introduced decreases the percentage of cases where the Supreme Court reviews an Act of Congress in which the Court declares the Act of Congress unconstitutional.

Another oversight of the existing literature on the impact of court-curbing legislation on judicial decision making is the assumption that the Supreme Court responds to the bills to protect the entire federal judiciary’s institutional legitimacy (e.g., Clark 2009, 2011; Marshall, Curry, and Pacelle 2014; Rosenberg 1992). Court-curbing bills target the entire federal judiciary, not just the Supreme Court; however, empirical work only tests whether the justices seek to restore the Supreme Court’s institutional legitimacy by deferring to legislative preferences through the act of declaring fewer federal laws unconstitutional or adjusting the ideological content of decisions (e.g., Clark 2009, 2011; Marshall, Curry, and Pacelle 2014).

The distribution of judicial power within the federal judiciary is often thought of in terms of a hierarchy with the Supreme Court at the top as the final arbiter of issues pertaining to federal law and the Constitution. It is the Supreme Court that establishes doctrines for deciding cases that the lower federal courts should follow when confronting similar issues. A substantial body of work finds that the circuit and district courts do in fact follow Supreme Court precedent (e.g., Benesh 2002; Johnson 1987; Reddick and Benesh 2000; Songer, Segal, and Cameron 1994; Songer and Sheehan 1990). Thus, the justices are likely able to shield the federal judiciary from additional attacks by deferring to congressional preferences after the introduction of court-
curbing legislation. This response to court-curbing legislation simultaneously helps the justices restore the federal judiciary’s institutional legitimacy and signals to the lower federal courts to defer to Congress as well.

Although there is evidence that the federal courts hand down decisions that follow Supreme Court precedent and conform to the preferences of the current justices, some studies do not find this to be the case (e.g., Cross 2003; Klein 2002; Klein and Hume 2003). Furthermore, federal judges are often influenced by the preferences of a variety of actors, such as the appointing president, home state senators, and/or the current presidential administration (e.g., Giles, Hettinger, and Peppers 2001; Songer, Sheehan, and Haire 1999). As a result, it is possible that adjustments in Supreme Court decision making after the introduction of court-curbing legislation will not produce changes in lower federal court decision making. Without seeing a change in judicial decisionmaking across all federal courts, members of Congress may continue to introduce court-curbing legislation that attacks the judiciary’s institutional legitimacy. In order to avoid this scenario, it is likely that the Supreme Court justices take additional steps to restore the entire federal judiciary’s institutional legitimacy and protect the lower courts. In other words, the Supreme Court acts as a guardian for the lower federal courts.

The institutional maintenance model of Court-Congress relations best explains how the justices will respond to court-curbing legislation to restore its institutional legitimacy (and the entire federal judiciary’s in the process); however, specific efforts on behalf of the Supreme Court to protect the lower federal courts is best characterized by the principal-agent framework. The hierarchical nature of the federal judiciary lends itself well to the main idea behind the principal-agent framework: that the Supreme Court (principal) supervises the lower federal courts (agents) to encourage decisions that match the preferences of the justices on the bench.
Although principals often lack an enforcement mechanism to ensure compliance, at least within the context of the relationship amongst the federal courts, the Supreme Court can reward compliant lower courts with complimentary citations in opinions and reprimand judges by overturning their decisions (e.g., Fiss 1983; Brent 1999; Cameron, Segal, and Songer 2000; Cross 2003; Haire, Lindquist, and Songer 2003; Schanzenbach and Tiller 2007). Thus, in order to act as a guardian of the lower federal judiciary and encourage the courts to protect their own institutional legitimacy after the introduction of court-curbing legislation, the Supreme Court likely “corrects” instances of judicial review on the lower courts. In other words, following the sponsorship of court-curbing legislation, the Supreme Court reverses more lower court decisions that had declared an Act of Congress unconstitutional. This expectation is summarized in the following hypothesis:

\[ H3: \text{An increase in the number of court-curbing bills introduced increases the likelihood that the Supreme Court reverses a lower federal court’s decision to declare an Act of Congress unconstitutional.} \]

**Data and Methods**

To test our hypotheses, we need measures of when the Supreme Court reviews an act of Congress, if they uphold or strike down the Act of Congress, and how the lower court treated the Act of Congress. Since our theory suggests that the Court acts as a guardian of the federal judiciary, responding to bills targeted at lower courts in addition to the Supreme Court, we constrain our analysis to cases in which the Supreme Court reviews a federal court. To gather the measures that will help us craft our outcome variables, we must code each case.\(^1\) Thus, we

\(^1\) While our goal is to code every case, at this point, we have only made it through roughly 700 cases for this purpose. We intend to extend our coding, as well as employ alternative metrics for our Court support variable, including the divergence proxy that Clark (2009) uses, which will
review each Supreme Court case and the corresponding lower court decision. With each case we determine whether each court reviewed an Act of Congress. We code six variables that describe the fate of a law in the course of the case. The first two variables, *Supreme Court Reviews Act* and *Lower Court Reviews Act* determine whether the Court chose to review an Act of Congress. The next four determine the direction of the treatment of the Act of Congress: *Supreme Court Upheld, Supreme Court Struck Down, Lower Court Upheld, Lower Court Struck Down*.

To test our hypotheses we will take both a year-level and a case-level approach. For the year-level approach, we test two different outcome variables. The first is the percentage of cases in which the Supreme Court reviews an Act of Congress. To test this, we take the number of cases in which the Court reviewed an Act of Congress in a year and divide it by the total number of cases heard in the year. We then test the percentage of those cases that the Court finds unconstitutional. Since both of these outcome variables are percentages, we use logistic regression models to model these outcomes. At the case-level, our outcome variable measures the extent to which the Court is acting as a guardian, correcting instances where the lower court strikes an Act of Congress. We model this as an ordinal measure, ranging from anti-guardian behavior, where the Supreme Court is at least as negative towards the Act of Congress than the lower court, to guardian, where the Court is at least as positive towards the Act of Congress than
the lower court. At each level there are three possible outcomes: do not review the act, uphold the act, and strike down the act. This leads to a 3x3 arrangement, with 9 possible outcomes. In Table 1, we have outlined the possible outcomes and the corresponding value for our dependent variable. Since the outcome variable is ordinal, we estimate an ordinal logistic regression model.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Lower Court Struck Down</th>
<th>Lower Court Did Not Review</th>
<th>Lower Court Upheld</th>
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<tr>
<td>Supreme Court Struck Down</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supreme Court Did Not Review</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supreme Court Upheld</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Table 1**: Case-level outcome variable. The variable is positive when the Supreme Court is at least as positive as the lower court and negative when they are at least as negative as the lower court. The variable is zero when neither the lower court nor the Supreme Court reviews an Act of Congress.

Our primary variable of interest in both models is the number of court-curbing bills introduced in Congress in the year prior to the case, $\text{Court Curbing Bills}_{t-1}$. We use Clark’s (2009) count of court-curbing bills. This data is available through 2008.

In both analyses, we, following Clark (2009), include as controls, measures of the political alignment between Congress and the Court, $\text{Opposite Party Congress}$, the Court’s support, $\text{GSS Support}$, and whether it is an election year, $\text{Election Year}$. For $\text{Opposite Party Congress}$, the Supreme Court’s party is measured as the party of appointing president of each justice on the Court. The party that appointed the majority of justices on the Court is considered the Court’s party for our purposes. $\text{Opposite Party Congress}$ is equal to one if both chambers of Congress are controlled by the same party as the Court’s party and zero otherwise. We also include a measure of the Court’s support measured using the General Social Survey (GSS), $\text{GSS Support}$. Following Clark, we use the percentage of people responding they have “hardly any”
confidence in the Court in that year. For the years where the question was not asked, we use the average of the year before and after the missing observation. Finally, since the introduction of court-curbing bills is largely a position-taking endeavor, we include a variable indicating whether or not it is an election year, Election Year. The variable is equal to one in a congressional election year, and zero in non-election years.

For the case-level analysis, we also include a categorical measure of the lower court’s treatment of the act, Lower Court Treatment. The variable takes on three values, Lower Court Upheld, Lower Court Struck Down, and Lower Court Did Not Review. This variable allows us to test whether the lower Court’s behavior changes the likelihood of the Court engaging in guardian behavior.

**Results**

We find little evidence in support of the institutional maintenance hypotheses. Table 2 shows the results of our two year-level analyses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) Laws Reviewed</th>
<th>(2) Laws Found Unconstitutional</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Opposite Party Congress</strong></td>
<td>-1.47 (0.90)</td>
<td>2.69* (1.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Court Curbing Bills</strong></td>
<td>-0.01 (0.06)</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Election Year</strong></td>
<td>0.15 (1.00)</td>
<td>0.03 (1.37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GSS Support</strong></td>
<td>-0.12 (0.18)</td>
<td>0.15 (0.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constant</strong></td>
<td>3.58 (2.82)</td>
<td>-4.67 (3.79)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| N | 36 | 25 |

standard errors in parentheses  
* p<0.05

**Table 2:** Results of year-level analysis. Column one displays the results of the model estimating the percentage of cases in which the Court reviews an Act of Congress. Column two displays the results of the model estimating the percentage of those cases where the Court finds a law unconstitutional.
We do not find evidence that the number of court curbing bills influences either the percentage of laws reviewed, or the percentage of laws that the Court finds unconstitutional. We do find that the Court strikes down more of the laws it reviews when the opposite party controls both chambers of Congress. This to some extent undermines the institutional maintenance theory, since under this theory, the Court would be less likely to strike laws it reviews when the opposite party controls Congress so that Congress will not overturn their decision. We, again, are hesitant to draw too much from these findings, as the data used to compile our year estimates are not yet complete, and moreover, we have a very small N. In the future, we plan to complete the data collection process as well as employ alternative measures for Court support that will extend our analysis.

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<table>
<thead>
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<tr>
<td>Opposite Party Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>Court Curbing Bills</td>
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<td>2.22* (0.84)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cut Neutral</td>
<td>-2.91* (0.84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut Guardian</td>
<td>4.53* (0.87)</td>
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<td>--------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>780</td>
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* p<0.05

standard errors in parentheses

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Table 3: Results of case-level analysis. The outcome variable is the Guardian variable that measures whether the Supreme Court attempts to correct negative treatment of laws by the lower courts.

In Table 3, we present the results of our case-level analysis. Again, we find little evidence in support of the institutional maintenance hypothesis. The Court Curbing Bills
variable does not reach conventional levels of significance. The two lower court variables, however, are statistically significant. This suggests that when a lower court reviews an Act of Congress, the Supreme Court is more likely to behave in guardian behavior, either upholding positive treatments of these laws by the lower court, or reversing the lower court’s negative treatment. This guardian behavior, however, is not tied to Congress’s attempts to curb the judiciary. Instead, the Supreme Court engages in this kind of behavior regardless of whether Congress is attempting to induce such behavior through introducing court-curbing bills.

**Discussion and Conclusion**

We do not find any evidence supporting our institutional maintenance hypotheses. At the yearly level, we fail to find evidence of a relationship between court-curbing bills and either the percentage of cases in which the Court considers the constitutionality of a statute, or the percentage of those cases where the Court chooses to strike the statute. At the case-level, while we find evidence of guardian behavior by the Supreme Court when the lower courts review Acts of Congress, this behavior is not connected to the number of court-curbing bills introduced in line with the institutional maintenance hypotheses.

We are hesitant to draw too many conclusions from our findings at this time until we have fully collected the data for our analysis. We intend to continue collecting case-level data, which will lead to stronger aggregate level data as well. We also plan to further extend our analysis. We would like to incorporate information about the Acts that are being reviewed. While the institutional maintenance model makes sense when the Court reviews recent statutes, where the Court reviews an Act that Congress also dislikes, we might expect the Court to be more likely to strike the law under the institutional maintenance framework, rather than uphold the law. Thus, we plan to incorporate information about the Act being challenged, including the
ideal points of the enacting coalition. This will allow us to better determine the grounds on which the Court is making their decisions about when to review a statute as well as its ultimate decision to either uphold or reverse the Act.
References


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